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Categorizing or sorting tasks which require a 
subject to separate a set of stimulus objects or state­
ments into groups is an operation rooted in the earliest 
psychophysical experiments and in the development of 
scaling procedures such as the Thurstone (Thurstone &
Chave, 1929) and Likert (1932) scales. Later developments 
in scaling procedures shifted the emphasis to performance 
on sorting tasks as a measure of strength of attitudes 
(Sherif & Hovland, 1953)- Sorting tasks have also been 
used to discover the level of conceptual organization used 
by individual subjects, e.g., Goldstein & Scheerer (l94l).
In both of these developments the emphasis is generally on 
discovering the dimensions or principles of organization 
of experience and behavior.
Another use of categorizing tasks came from research 
in psychotherapy and personality. Much of the impetus for 
this direction came from Rogers and his associates (Rogers
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& Dymond, 195^) and stressed the motivational properties 
deriving from discrepancies between self and ideal self. 
Interest in this discrepancy as a motivational construct 
has not been confined to the Rogers group, however, and 
has other theoretical roots, e.g., Angyal (I965) and Kelly 
(1955)- Operationally, the self-ideal discrepancy has been 
obtained on a variety of instruments. In addition to the 
Q sort (Stephenson, 1953) as used by Butler and Haigh (1954) 
the self-ideal discrepancy has been obtained on the Inter­
personal Check List (Leary, 1954) and Osgood's (Osgood, et. 
al., 1964) semantic differential, e.g.. Moss (1953).
Along with these developments the sorting task it­
self underwent various modifications. For example, the Q 
sort and the Thurstone and Likert techniques imposed limits 
upon the number of categories available to a subject or 
judge. The own-categories technique developed by Sherif 
and Hovland (1953) and the Object Sorting Test of Gardner 
(1953) allowed the subject to determine the number of cate­
gories .
Sherif and Hovland's (1953) own-categories tech­
nique grew out of observations of judges' responses while 
constructing a Thurstone scale. It was discovered that 
judges tended to displace more neutral items away from 
their own position and that judges who felt most strongly 
about an issue neglected some of the intermediate cate­
gories- Hence, it was felt that if the judges were allowed
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to determine the number of categories the number used might 
be useful as an index of the intensity of involvement in an 
issue. The results of subsequent investigations showed per­
sons holding a strong pro-position on an issue tended to 
use fewer categories and to displace neutral items away from 
their own position (Sherif & Hovland, 1953)- Further study 
has shown fewer categories are used not only by persons who 
have a strong favorable position (Reich and Sherif, I963) 
but also by those strongly committed to a negative position 
(Vaughan, I96I).
These findings are not interpreted by the authors 
to mean these subjects are not capable of making finer dis­
criminations. In the Reich and Sherif (I963) study, for 
example, the League of Women Voters subjects who were highly 
conversant with the complexities of the issue (reapportion­
ment) used fewer categories than subjects who were much less 
knowledgeable about the issue. As stated elsewhere, ". . .
they could have made fine discrimination on the basis of 
their superior information, but they did not" (Sherif,
Sherif, & Nebergall, I965, P- 124).
As a result of accumulated evidence the phenomenon 
of fewer categories as a function of greater involvement is 
now accepted. It is ". . . probably related to the assimila-
tion-contrast effects relative to his (subject's) own stand. 
Logically, at least, these systematic displacements would 
result in a need for fewer categories" (Sherif & Sherif,
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1967 5 p. 127). That is, the ’’own position" provides an 
anchor at one end of a polarized evaluative scale. At that 
end of the continuum the subject's latitude of acceptance 
is relatively narrow, i.e., he is more careful of accepting 
items into a category representing his own position and 
closely related assimilated positions. The displacement of 
items can then be seen as a function of the lowering of the 
level of rejection (contrast effect). This behavior seems 
to reflect the attitude that "those who are not for us are 
against us."
A cogent evaluation of own-categories particularly 
relevant to this study was stated by Hartley (1967, p . 94):
I like the own-categories technique for attitude 
study, not because it serves a better definition of 
attitude but because it builds toward a more adequate 
cognitive mapping of the individual's social field.
It locates the boundaries for positive and negative 
valences and gives a synthesis of cognitive and cona­
tive components in a manageable manner (Hartley, I967, 
p. 94).
Similarly, Bieri (I967) states, "although a start 
has been made to link the development of cognitive struc­
tures to attitudes, especially in relation to attitudes 
toward authority, this effort can only be considered to 
have barely begun" (Bieri, I967, p. I8I).
In recent years cognition has become a focus of 
one of the major orientations in the study of personality. 
This emphasis,
. . - shows itself in various ways, e.g., in
stressing self-regulative aspects of cognitive
functioning; or in regarding conceptual structures as 
major motivating influences in behavior; or in view­
ing organismic regulation in terms of cognitive con­
trols that are superordinate to the action of motives 
with the priority previously given to drive replaced 
by a conception of cognitive control of drive (Klein, 
Barr, & Wolitzky, I967, p . 483)-
The work of Witkin, Dyk, Paterson, Goodenough, and 
Karp (1962), and Gardener (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton,
& Spence, 1959; Gardner & Schoen, I962) exemplifies the 
work done in the area of cognitive control. The basic pre­
mise of this work has been . . that the wide range of
behaviors with which an individual encounters reality may 
be encompassed by relatively few dimensions of organization" 
(Gardner, et al., 1959, P- 1). Thus, cognitive control is 
seen as a relatively stable organizational principle having 
to do with ". . . the manner of coordination between a
class of adaptive intentions and a class of environmental 
situations" (Gardner, et. al., 1959, PP• 5-6)- Several 
different cognitive controls, coexisting but varying within 
the whole constellation is referred to as "cognitive style."
Part of Gardner's theoretical concern was the rela­
tionship of cognitive control to psychoanalytic theory. He 
sees cognitive control and Hartmann's (1939) conflict-free 
spheres of ego-functioning as synonymous. Hence, cognitive 
controls are seen as adaptive in that they: a) govern in­
formational feedback, b) involve automatized standards of 
adequacy in perceptual, cognitive and motor activities, and 
c) in that . . the outcome of a cognitive control is a
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pattern of attribution in which stimulus events and ideas 
are brought into a relation to each other as relevant and 
irrelevant, experienced and unexperienced, segments of a 
stimulus field” (Gardner, et. al., 1959» PP• 10-11).
To test the adequacy of the operations associated 
with the various controls Gardner, et. al. (1959) conducted 
a factor analytic study using measures that had been devel­
oped by the group in previous research. The controls were:
Leveling-sharpening (Holzman & Klein, 1951» 1954; 
Holzman, 1954; Holzman & Gardner, 1959); scanning 
(Schlesinger, 1954; Holzman & Klein, 1956; Gardner, 
1959); constricted-flexible control (Smith & Klein, 
1953); equivalence range (Gardner, 1953; Sloane,
1959); and tolerance for unrealistic experiences 
(Klein & Schlesinger, 1951) (Gardner, et. al., 1959»
PP. 16-17)•
Measures of Witkin's (1964) field dependence-independence 
were also included in that study.
The equivalence range control is of particular in­
terest here in that the defining operation is a categorizing 
task (Object Sorting Task) requiring the subject to ”put 
together into groups the objects which seem to you to go 
together” (Gardner, et. al., 1959» P* 4l). The instructions 
were worded to encourage spontaneous categorizing behavior. 
There is no dimension specified as in categories”
techniques. The obtained measure is the number of cate­
gories. Measures obtained from a perceptual judgment task 
did not materially add to the definition of the control.
No equivalence range factor was found for men but this
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measure defined one factor for women. Since equivalence 
range was not found in any other factor, it was suggested 
that the Object Sorting Task was the most direct measure 
of equivalence range.
Both field dependence-independence and constricted- 
flexible controls contributed to Factor I, the field-articu- 
lation factor. Embedded Figures and the Rod-and-Frame Test 
appeared to be adequate measures of the field-articulation 
control.
In subsequent investigations (Gardner & Schoen,
1962) equivalence range was renamed conceptual differentia­
tion . The three studies reported in this monograph were 
aimed at exploring situational generality of indivudual con­
sistencies in conceptual differentiation and the relationship 
between conceptual differentiation and level of abstraction. 
The investigations were also concerned with relating their 
findings to those reported by other investigations.
In the first study of the Gardner and Schoen mono­
graph (1962) 16 measures were obtained. For measuring con­
ceptual differentiation and level of abstraction the Object 
Sorting Test, a Behavior Sorting Task, and a Photo Sorting 
Task were used. On these tasks subjects were required to 
define their categories in order to obtain information on 
the level of abstraction. The scoring of number of cate­
gories was such that items put together which were not con­
ceptualized by the subject as having a relationship other
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than ’’things left over” were counted as separate groups 
(Gardner & Schoen, I962).
Other tests were used which have been used by other 
investigators to define constructs which are conceptually 
related to conceptual differentiation: Rokeach's (1951)
Narrow-Minded Test, Pettigrew’s (195^) Category-Width 
Scale, Higgin's (1961) Social Comprehension Questionnaire, 
and two forms of Kelly's (1955) Role Construct Repertory 
Test (RCRT). Two check lists were also used: Tresselt and
Mayzner's (1958) Word-Concept Check List and Gough's (I96O) 
Adjective Check List.
Two independent groups of significant correlations 
were obtained: the number of categories on the three sort­
ing tasks and the number of adjectives checked on the three 
versions of Gough's (I960) Adjective Check List. There was 
no relationship found between the two sets of measures.
The number of constructs on the RCRT and the category width 
tests did not correlate with any of the other measures.
Low negative correlations were obtained between number of 
categories and preferred level of abstraction. These in­
vestigators conclude differentiation and preferred level of 
abstraction are two distinctly different variables. The 
lack of relationship between RCRT and level of abstraction 
also leads the authors to take exception to Harvey, Hunt, 
and Schroeder's (1961) suggestion that number of constructs 
produced on RCRT reflects a general constellation of behaviors
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defining abstraction.
The second of the three studies in the monograph 
(Gardner & Schoen, 1962) involved giving additional tests 
to 40 of the original sample of 70 and selecting I8 of the 
total measures for factor analysis. The additional tests 
included an Adjective Sorting Test, Fillenbaum's (1959) 
Self-Sorting Task, and a Self-Rating Test, a free-associa- 
tion test, a ’’distance" test using a TAT (Morgan & Murray, 
1935) card, a Square and Rectangle Test, a Range Width Test, 
Fillenbaum's (1959) synonym test, and Frederiksen and Mes- 
sick's (1959) Evaluation of Revisions Test. Four factors 
were extracted: I, conceptual differentiation; II, defined
by loading on the adjective check lists; III, level of ab­
straction; and IV, an unexpected factor paradoxically load­
ing on broad conceptual span on two tests (Range-Width Test 
and the free-association test), while loading on narrow 
conceptual span on two sorting tests and self-rating tests 
(Self-Sorting Task, Adjective-Sorting Task, and Self-Rating 
Test). This last factor is of particular interest in this 
study in that the mode of organization in the self domain 
appears to be different from the other patterns of organiza­
tion. It is important to note that the instructions in­
volved the subject self-reflexively on the self-rating tasks. 
That is, the subjects were asked, as on the Self-Rating Test 
to indicate the degree to which an adjective described him.
The third study in the group (Gardner & Schoen,
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1962) showed that there was no relationship between concep­
tual differentiation and preferred level of abstraction.
From these studies the authors conclude preferred 
level of abstraction varies over time and from situation to 
situation. One factor suggests one form of abstraction re­
lated to verbal skills is independent of that found in the 
sorting tasks. Conceptual differentiation is independent 
of level of abstraction at which the subjects choose to 
function and the subjects' capacity to abstract.
Glixman (I965) used three categorizing tasks, which, 
from the content, were referred to as object, war, and self 
domains. These domains were seen as being hierarchically 
ordered in terms of personal significance. The object and 
war domains thus correspond to Gardner's object sort and 
the social issues which are the subject of attitudinal stu­
dies using Own Categories Procedures. The rationale for 
the self domain task was based on the differentiation 
hypothesis of Witkin, et. al., (I962). According to this 
hypothesis the degree of differentiation of the behavioral 
world is a function of the way the individual differentiates 
himself. Hence, this study can be seen in part as a test 
of the differentiation hypothesis.
From his data (included as Tables 9 and 10 in Chap­
ter III) Glixman (1965) concludes: a) categorizing behavior
is consistent across domains within individuals, and b) the 
largest number of categories is associated with the least
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significant or ego-relevant domain (objects), and c) the 
most unequal distribution of items over the categories 
used is associated with the most significant domain (self). 
The overall results are seen as offering substantive support 
to both Gardner's and Sherif and Hovland's position in that 
the . . data presented here indicate that the individual's
organization of events in a specific domain is also a func­
tion of his general mode of organizing events" (Glixman,
1965, p. 375) • A secondary finding was a sex difference in 
degree of organization with women tending to use more cate­
gories .
In a subsequent investigation Glixman (1967) ex­
plored not only the sex difference, but examiner and exam- 
iner-sex effects upon categorizing behavior. Two domains 
were used in this study, objects and self. There were no 
subject-sex differences found as in previous research but 
there was an examiner-sex effect which suggests previous 
sex differences may have been a function of using male 
examiners. Examiner effects appear to be a relatively 
minor factor in treatment effects but complicate interpre­
tation because of the contribution to interaction effects.
The results of this study raised an even more important 
question: "In considering the kind of organizing process
that is represented by categorizing events, one is led 
directly to the question of whether this process changes 
as a function of interactions among people" (Glixman, I967,
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p. 115)- From this study it would appear that categorizing 
behavior represents considerably more variance than was as­
sumed by Gardner, et. al., (1959) who saw this behavior as 
representing a relatively stable organizational principle.
Another closely related study conducted by Glixman 
and Wolfe (I967) demonstrates a convergence of categorizing 
behavior and semantic differential responses on the concept 
of cognitive structure.
From this review of categorizing tasks it may be 
seen that the common factor in the various theoretical uses 
of the technique is the assumption that categorizing behav­
ior reflects a mode or level of organizing experience which 
is subject to degree of ego-relevance and interpersonal 
variables.
Another area of research relevant to the present 
study derives from the work of the Rogers group (Rogers & 
Dymond, 1954). It was in this group that the Butler-Haigh 
statements used in the present study and Glixman studies 
were developed. However, their original use was in obtain­
ing measures of self and ideal self. The statements were 
sorted twice, once for each of the concepts, self and ideal 
self, according to Q sort procedures developed by Stephenson 
(1953). This procedure requires the S to sort the state­
ments into 11 categories. The number of statements for each 
category is stipulated according to a distribution approxi­
mating the normal curve.
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The basic assumption for using the self-ideal dis­
crepancy was that it represented a motivational factor in 
the nature of a lack of self esteem which led to the indi­
vidual seeking psychotherapy, or more generally, to a re­
cognition of a need for change. As Butler and Haigh 
stated :
We hold that a discrepancy between the self- 
concept and the concept of the desired or valued 
self reflects a sense of self-dissatisfaction, 
which in turn generates the motivation for coming 
into counseling. Such a discrepancy ordinarily 
exists when an individual comes for help. It is 
our hypothesis that this self-dissatisfaction is 
reduced as a result of counseling (Butler & Haigh,
1954, p. 58).
There seems to be another assumption underlying 
this one, that is, the motivational property is a linear 
function of the magnitude of the self-ideal discrepancy. 
There has been some evidence that this variable is not a 
unitary dimension. For example, Guertin and Jourard's 
(1962) factor analysis including a self-ideal measure re­
vealed a sex difference in terms of a social desirability 
factor which loaded heavily for the male subject of low 
self esteem.
In spite of these reservations, self-ideal discre­
pancy and the various measures associated with it continue 
to be used, as witness the current literature (e.g.. Demark 
& Guttentag, I967; Kaplan & Shannon, I966).
The interest in this study is directed toward the 
self-ideal discrepancy as a construct rather than in the
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categorizing task (Q sort) first associated with it.
This review and examination of representative stu­
dies was aimed at providing some ground for considering the 
relationship of ego-involvement and cognitive structuring 
as they converge on the operation of categorizing tasks. 
Further convergence seems possible with the inclusion of 
the self-ideal construct in that cognitive organization as 




The purpose of this study is to explore the possi­
bility that a differential response to categorizing tasks 
of two degrees of ego-involvement reflects different modes 
of cognitive organization. Differential response here 
refers to the comparative number of categories a subject 
uses when sorting identical sets of statements under two 
different instructional sets which presumably control the 
degree of ego-involvement. Under the condition of greater 
ego-involvement a subject has the option of using: a)
fewer, b) more, or c) the same number of categories rela­
tive to the number used under less ego-involving instruc­
tions.
The rationale for this study arises from an inter­
est in: a) the various ways ego-involvement has been man­
ipulated in studying its relationship with categorizing 
behavior; b) the minority of subjects whose responses vary 
from theoretical expectation; and c) the relationship of 
self-ideal discrepancy, ego-involvement, and the substrate 
of personality referred to as conceptual differentiation.
15
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The first concern of this study is the manipulation 
and control of ego-involvement. This variable has been 
controlled in previous studies in three ways :
a) In the Sherif and Hovland (1953) study this var­
iable was manipulated through the choice of subjects for 
whom there was some ^  priori or independent evidence of 
varying degrees of involvement in a particular issue. It 
should be noted also that in this study the dimension (fa­
vorable-unfavorable) for the categorizing task was set by 
the experimenter, i.e., subjects were asked to use as many 
categories as necessary to delineate the stand reflected by 
the statements on the social position of the Negro.
b) Another procedure for controlling the degree of 
ego-involvement is in ^  priori choice of domains to be 
sorted. Glixman (I965) used three domains, objects , war, 
and self, which were presumed to represent three degrees 
of ego-relevance.
c) A third procedure, which in effect became the 
model for this aspect of the present study, is the manip­
ulation of ego-involvement by variation of instructions, 
as done by Briece (1966). In this procedure two identical 
sets of statements were used. For the first sort the sub­
jects were given the instructions developed by Gardner 
(1953). (Identical instructions were used in the Glixman 
study as well.) Essentially, the instructions are to ’’put 
the statements together that seem to you to go together
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for some particular reason.” On the other set of identical 
statements the subjects were instructed to sort the state­
ments together "as they relate to you." The intent was 
that the instructions for the first sort would represent a 
condition of "non-ego-invoIvement" and the second one of 
ego-involvement. Briece apparently felt, however, that 
some subjects did not remain non-involved while sorting the 
first set. In the present study the instructions were also 
modified for the "non-involved" sorting task so that a non­
involved set would be more clearly established.
The second concern of this study is the minority of 
subjects whose responses vary from expectation. Returning 
to the studies just discussed, the general conclusion is 
that "intensely involved individuals with extreme positions 
are more likely to adopt a constricted scale (with few 
categories) (Sherif & Hovland, 1953, P- 375) and, in Glix­
man, ". . . it has been demonstrated here that as a meaning
domain increases in personal relevance within individuals, 
there is a decrease in number of categories used" (Glixman,
1965, p. 375).
An inspection of Sherif and Hovland's results re­
veals, however, that 32.9% of the Negroes who presumably 
had strong pro-Negro attitudes adopted extended scales (5 
or more categories) rather than constricted scales (4 or 
fewer categories).
From the published data in the Glixman (I965) study
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it can only be suspected that the use of fewer categories 
for the ego-relevant domain (self) was less than unanimous. 
In the Briece (I966) study the proportion of differential 
responses is much clearer. Of 40 Ss 17 used fewer cate­
gories under the condition of greater ego-involvement, 17 
used the same, and 6 used more categories. Even though 
the ambiguous instructions for the non-involved condition 
probably contributed to these results, less than half of 
the subjects followed theoretical expectations. In plot­
ting the number of categories against the self-ideal dis­
crepancy there appeared to be some indication that the 
relationship between the two variables was different for 
subjects who used fewer, rather than more or the same num­
ber of categories with ego-involvement. It should be noted 
that this was not of concern in that study and was not ex­
plored .
The point here is not to attack the conclusions or 
generalizations of these studies, but rather to raise the 
question of whether or not subjects who do not respond ac­
cording to theoretical expectations may also be responding 
in a consistent way of organizing behavior which is not as 
readily perceived as in the majority of subjects.
The third area of concern is the relationship of 
self-ideal discrepancy to categorizing behavior. Wolfe 
(1966) has recently shown that fewer categories are used 
as a function of stress. In view of the way self-ideal
19
discrepancy score is used variously to define self-comfort, 
self-esteem, etc., it seems reasonable to regard it as a 
kind of internal, characterological stress or incongruity 
which would be reflected in categorizing behavior.
From the point of view of Witkin, et. al., (I962) 
making differentiations in the world is a function of the 
way differentiations of self are made. It should then be 
of profit to investigate the relationship of self-ideal 
discrepancy and categorizing behavior in minimal ego- 
involving tasks.
Further, self-ideal measures are, by definition, 
obtained under a condition of ego-involvement. Since self­
ideal discrepancy implies a relative evaluation of self, it 
would appear that exploring the possible relationship with 
other ego-relevant behaviors would be helpful in understand­
ing the effects and nature of ego-involvement.
Finally, the exploration of these various relation­
ships should possibly reveal whether or not there are pat­
terns of response that reliably differentiate people on the 
basis of differential response to ego-involvement. Since 
sex differences have been shown in related studies this 
variable will be retained in the present study. In these 
terms this study is concerned with six possible groups as 
defined by differential response and sex. These groups are, 
then, male Ss who use: 1) fewer, 2) more, and 3) same num­
ber of categories; and female Ss who use: 4) fewer, 5 ) more.
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and 6) same number of categories in sorting under ego- 
involved conditions as compared wi'Ui less ego-involved 
conditions.
From these general concerns the following specific 
questions have been asked:
1. Proportion of differential responses.
a. What is the proportion of subjects who use: 
a) fewer, b) more, and c) the same number 
of categories under the condition of greater 
ego-involvement when ego-involvement is ma­
nipulated by instructions and Ss are free to 
devise their own schema? (For convenience, 
differential response under the two instruc­
tion situations will be said to define a 
shift group.)
2. Ego-involvement and number of categories.
a. Is there any difference between groups in 
the number of categories when ego-involve­
ment is minimal?
b. Is there any difference between groups in 
the number of categories with greater ego- 
involvement ?
c . Is there a significant difference in number 
of categories within each group between the 
number of categories used under the two con­
ditions of ego-involvement? To answer this
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and the following questions, comparisons of 
the groups will be between shift groups 
within and across sex, between sex groups 
within and across shift , and between and 
within the two sorts of varying ego-involve­
ment .
3 . Self-ideal discrepancy and categorizing behav­
ior .
a. When the subjects are separated according to 
sex and differential response (shift) to ego- 
involvement, are there different patterns in 
the relationship of self-ideal discrepancy 
and number of categories when ego-involvement 
is minimal?
b. When the subjects are separated according to 
sex and differential response to ego-involve­
ment , are there different patterns between 
the groups in the relationship of self-ideal 
discrepancy and number of categories under 
the condition of greater ego-involvement?
4. Assuming that performing on the semantic differ­
ential requires certain cognitive functions ap­
propriate to that task, it seems reasonable that 
a gross measure of these functions can be seen 
in the total of difference scores across a num­
ber of concepts and scales. It then becomes
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possible to ask these additional questions:
a. Are there different patterns between the 
groups in the relationship of number of 
categories and the sum of the difference 
scores on the semantic differential?
b. Are there different patterns between the 
groups in the relationship of self-ideal 
discrepancy and the sum of a number of 




Subjects. The subjects in this study were 49 re­
spondents out of 100 randomly selected elementary teachers 
in the Oklahoma City Public Schools. All male and female 
teachers in that system were numbered separately. A table 
of random numbers (Dixon & Massey, 1957i PP- 366-370) was 
then used to obtain a sample of 50 male and 50 female 
teachers. A packet containing an invitation to participate 
in the study, test materials, instructions, and return en­
velope was sent through the school mail. Of this sample,
20 males and 29 females returned completed protocols.
Instruments. This study investigated the relation­
ship of responses to two instruments, the semantic differ­
ential (Osgood, 1957) and 50 of the Butler-Haigh (Rogers 
and Diamond, 1954) self statements.
The semantic differential consisted of l4 scales 
selected from those showing relatively high loading in the 
various factor analytic studies reported by Osgood (1957)* 
Although care was taken to select items from the three 
factors, activity, potency, and evaluation, it was for the
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purpose of tapping as broad a range of experience as pos­
sible rather than, as Osgood used them, to establish Dis­
tance scores on these dimensions. Since the interest here 
was in the actual number of differentiations made rather 
than the specific content of each differentiation, it was 
felt this instrument would yield maximum data within the 
limits of time subjects were likely to be willing to give 
to the tasks.
Scales were used to obtain responses to each of 
the concepts, My Own Self (s ), Ideal Self (i). General 
Concensus of Ideal Teacher (t^) , and Own Ideal Teacher 
(tg). It was assumed the latter two concepts would be 
relevant to the teacher subjects and would screen the real 
purpose which was simply to obtain additional responses on 
this instrument.
Since the interest here is in the actual number of 
differentiations made, the following procedure was used to 
obtain six different scores; a) each of the seven places 
on each of the scales was numbered from 1 to 7, b ) the 
absolute difference between all pairs of concepts on each 
scale was obtained, c) the absolute differences for each 
pair of concepts was summed across scales, and d) this 
procedure yielded the following difference scores (D):
Dsi, Dst̂ , Dstg, Dit̂ , Dit^, Dt^t^- here refers to dif-
ference, not to Distance score as in Osgood, 1964.) The 
first of these is, of course, the self-ideal difference
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score. The other D scores on the Semantic Differential 
were added to obtain the index of differentiation style.
This score will be referred to as %  ad. (% ad = Dst^ +
Dstg + Dit^ + Ditg + Dt^tg.)
Categorizing tasks. Two identical sets of 50 ran­
domly chosen Butler-Haigh (Rogers & Dymond, 195^) self 
statements were used for these tasks. These statements are 
listed in Appendix A. Two levels of ego-involvement were 
established by varying instructions. The instructions are 
based on those developed by Gardner (1953) for the Object- 
Sorting task used to obtain a measure of equivalence range. 
Essentially, they were to "put the statements together that 
seem to you to go together for some particular reason." The 
modification for the first task (Sort I) had the added stip­
ulation to "treat the statements as statements, ignoring the 
fact they are first person or self-referring statements." 
This instruction defines the condition of less ego-involve­
ment .
The instructions for Sort II were to "put the state­
ments together which belong together as they apply to you." 
This instruction defines the condition of greater ego- 
involvement .
The differential response is the comparative number 
of categories a subject used on Sort II. For convenience, 
a use of fewer categories on Sort II will be referred to as 
a negative shift (ns), a use of more categories on Sort II
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a positive shift (ps), and the same number of categories 
on both sorts as a zero shift (zs).
Procedures
A booklet was constructed consisting of instruc­
tions for the semantic differential, the concepts to be 
rated, and instructions for the sorting tasks. The cover 
page was an introductory note from the experimenter which 
stipulated that experimental control was being sacrificed 
so that participation in the study could be anonymous and 
confidentiality thus assured. It was felt this was essen­
tial in view of the experimenter's position with the school 
system. It was hoped this would reduce the probable effects 
of source on the results. The instructions for the semantic 
differential are from Osgood (1957)-
The instructions for the two sorting tasks were 
given on the last two pages of the booklet. Obviously, 
there was no way to control for the subject being aware of 
the nature of both sorting instructions before doing them. 
Following the instructions for Sort II there were brief 
instructions for returning the completed protocol in the 
school mail.
A third set of 50 blank IBM cards was included in 
the packet to be used to separate the stacks or categories.
The entire protocol was as follows:
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INTRODUCTION
You are being asked to participate in a disserta­
tion study. This request for your participation is made 
in connection with my candidacy for a Ph.D. degree in 
clinical psychology at the University of Oklahoma. Pre­
senting the material in this fashion, through the mail, is 
somewhat unusual in that there is an obvious loss of exper­
imental control. However, there are certain advantages in 
that this is the only way the data can be obtained where it 
is manifestly clear that no names are used. Confidentiality 
may be thus totally assured. In other words, there is no 
possible way to associate this data with you. And for the 
purposes of this study this is absolutely necessary.
You are simply asked to participate. If you are 
willing to do so, turn this page and begin. However, if 
at any point, now or later in the test, you find, for any 
reason, you do not wish to continue, place all the material 
in the return envelope and place in the school mail.
1 will schedule a time next fall to present and 
discuss the results of this study with you.
Break the seal and begin when you feel that you may 
have at least 15 to 20 minutes to finish the first part of 
thê^ s tudy.
Thank you very much for your help.
Merl Cornelius
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The purpose of this portion of the study is to 
measure the meaning of certain concepts by having people 
judge them against a series of descriptive scales. In 
taking this test you will make some judgements as a kind 
of reporter of the concensus of opinions of people in the 
education profession. On other concepts you will be asked 
to make the judgements on the basis of what the concepts 
mean for you. Appropriate instructions will accompany 
each group of concepts. On the pages of this booklet you 
will find a concept at the top of the page and a series of 
scales beneath it. You are to rate the concept on each of 
these scales.
Here is how you are to use these scales:
If you feel that the concept at the top of the page is 
very closely related to one or the other end of the scale, 
you should place your check-mark as follows:
fair X :__ :____ :____:___:____:___  unfair
or
fair ___ :___:____:____:___:____ : X unfair
If you feel that the concept is quite closely related to 
one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you 
should place your check-mark as follows :
strong  : X :____ :____:___:____:___  weak
or
strong____:__ :____ :____:___: X :___  weak
If the concept seems only slightly related to one side as 
opposed to the other side (but not really neutral), then 
you should check as follows:
active ___ :___: X :____:___:____:___  passive
or
active ___ :___:____:____ : X :___ :___  passive
The direction toward which you check, of course, 
depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seems most 
characteristic of the concept you're judging. If you con­
sider the concept to be neutral on the scale, both sides of 
the scale equally associated with the concept, or if the 
scale is completely irrelevant, unrelated to the concept, 
then you should place your check-mark in the middle space:
safe ___ :___:____: X :___ :____:___  dangerous
IMPORTANT: 1. Place check-mark in the middle of the spaces,
not on the boundaries:
 : X :____ : X
This Not This
2. Be sure you check every scale for every 
concept.
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On the next two pages there are two concepts and 
a series of scales. The concepts are, My Actual Self and 
My Ideal Self. On these concepts check the scales as they 
apply to you.































The other two concepts were introduced as follows:)
You doubtless have participated in many discussions 
of what an ideal teacher is like. On this page you are to 
check the scales in whatever way seems best to reflect the 
general concensus of what other people seem to feel is an 
ideal teacher. (This concept was: General Concensus of
Ideal Teacher.)
On this page you are to check the scales in terms 
of your own notions about what constitutes an ideal teacher 
(My Ideal Teacher.)
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Since it is important to be able to take your time 
on the following tasks, do not continue unless you are rea­
sonably sure you may finish it without interruption (ap­
proximately 15 to 30 minutes.)
This last task involves the three stacks of IBM 
cards in your packet. There are two stacks of green cards, 
labelled _I and II, and a stack of yellow cards. Each of 
the green cards has a statement printed on it. The stacks 
are identical, but the instructions are different for the
way each is to be handled. (The instructions for the sec­
ond stack are on the following page and you are asked to
avoid looking at them until Stack I is finished.)
Now take Stack I. The instructions are simply to 
put together into groups the statements which seem to be­
long together. Treat the statements as statements, ignor­
ing the fact they are first person or self-referring state­
ments. You may have as many or as few statements in a 
group as you like, so long as the statements in each group 
belong together for one particular reason. If, after you 
have thought about all the statements, a few do not seem 
to belong with any of the others, you may put these state­
ments into groups by themselves. Please sort all the 
statements.
Obviously, there can be no right or wrong way to 
sort these statements. What is of interest is the way you 
sort them.
Be sure you have plenty of space. If you do not 
have a long counter space available, it might be helpful 
to place all the desks on the front row of a classroom 
together.
After you have sorted the statements to your satis­
faction take one of the yellow cards and place it on top of 
each group of green cards. Then, stack the groups in what­
ever order seems most appropriate. Be sure to place the 
card marked ^  back on top of the stack and replace the rub­
ber band.
Now, turn to the next page.
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Now take the second stack of green cards, labelled 
II. The procedure is essentially the same as that for Stack 
I. This time, however, you are to put the statements to­
gether which belong together as they apply to you. In all 
other respects follow the same procedure as with Stack I.
After you have sorted the statements into groups 
place one of the yellow cards on top of each group of state­
ments. Then, stack them in whatever order seems appropriate 
for you. Be sure to place the label card. Stack II, back on 
top and secure the stack with the rubber band.
Place all materials in the return envelope and place 
in the school mail.
Thank you very much for your help and cooperation.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
1. Proportion of differential responses. The 
distribution of Ss who used a) fewer, b ) more, and c) the 
same number of categories under the condition of greater 
ego-involvement is shown in Table 1. The distribution by 
shift and sex is not significantly different from chance. 
Even though there are more Ss who used fewer categories 
under the condition of greater ego-involvement than in 
either of the other two groups, they constitute less than 
50% of the Ss.
Table 1
Frequency of Differential Responses to Greater 
Ego-lnvolvement by Shift and Sex
Sex ns ps zs Total P
Male 8 8 4 20 1.59 .50
Female 14 8 7 29 2.95 <  .30
Total 22 16 11 49 3.71 <  .20
2 . Ego -involvement and number of categories . The
answers to the questions regarding this relationship are
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found in Table 2 and Table 3• Table 2 shows the mean number 
of categories used by Ss in each of the groups as defined by 
shift and sex on each of the sorts. Table 3 shows the re­
sults of _t tests of comparison of these means. The probab­
ilities are those associated with a two-tail test.
2a. As seen in Table 3 there is no significant 
difference between any of the groups tested in the number 
of categories when ego-involvement is minimal.
2b. On the other hand, under the condition of 
greater ego-involvement (Sort II), the comparison of the 
mean number of categories shows significant differences be­
tween male ns and ps Ss, female ns and ps Ss, and the total 
ns and ps Ss. The difference between female ps and zs Ss 
is not significant, but the difference between all ps and 
zs Ss is significant at the .05 level. The differences be­
tween female ns and zs Ss and between the total ns and zs 
Ss is not significant. Differences between male zs Ss and 
other groups were not computed because there were only four 
subjects in that group. There is no significant difference 
between the mean number of categories for male and female 
Ss. It would appear that group differences are cancelled 
when Ss are combined by sex whereas sharp differences ap­
pear when Ss are separated by shift.
2c. The _t tests of the differences between the 
mean number of categories on Sort I and Sort II is shown 
in Table 4. The listed probabilities are for a one-tail
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Table 2
Mean Number of Categories by Shift 
and Sex on Sort I and Sort II
Sort Sex ns ps zs Total
Male 8 .00 10.375 5.75 8.5
I F emale 11.00 9.125 7.571 9.655
Total 9.909 9.75 6.909 9.183
Male 4.00 15.125 5.75 8.8
II F emale 5.5 13.625 7.571 8.241
Total 4.954 14.375 6.909 8.469
Table 3
_t Tests of Mean Number of Categories 







ns 1.033 I .831 I .117 .086 1.416
I
ps I .761 1.526
* *ns 3.734 1 3 .752* 1.088 4 .904* 1.597II
ps __I 2.049 3 .013*
*Significant at .05 level , two-tail test.* *Significant at . 01 level , two-tail test.
Test not made because of small n in male zs group.
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test. (There is no difference for zs Ss by definition.)
Table 4
Differences Between Mean Number of Categories 
on Sort I and Sort II by Shift and Sex
Sex Shift
ns ps Total
1  P _t p 1  P
Male 3.63 <  .005 1.32 <.15 1.29 < .15
Female 2.487 <  .025 1.778 <.05 .921
Total 3.341 <  .005 3.058 <.005 .585
Tabled £  values are for one-tail test.
The difference between the means for the total of 
each shift group is significant at the .005 level. There 
is no significant difference for the totals within each 
sex. Within the groups, the difference is significant for 
the male ns Ss at the ,005 level, the female ns Ss at the 
.025 level, and the female ps Ss at the .05 level. There 
is no significant difference for the male ps Ss. The im­
portance of these statistics is not only in the differences 
that appear but in the fact that no difference in categor­
izing behavior as a function of ego-involvement would have 
been noted if the subjects had not been separated according 
to the differential responses.
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3- Dsi and Categorizing Behavior.
a. The first part of this question inquires 
into the relationship of self-ideal discrepancy (Dsi) and 
categorizing behavior when ego-involvement is minimal. To 
obtain an answer to this question a Pearson was obtained 
for each of the groups and for totals as shown in Table 5- 
The probabilities are for a two-tail test.
Table 5
Correlation of Number of Categories on 

























Tabled 2, values are for two-tail test.
Of the six groups only the male ns Ss show a relationship 
(r - -.6228) in the direction that would be predicted on 
the basis of previous research into the relationship of 
stress and categorizing behavior (Wolfe, I966). The ps Ss 
when combined across sex show a relationship (r = .46^6) 
but in the opposite direction. The female ns Ss show a 
zero correlation (R = .0059). This is the first evidence 
of a sex differential in the response patterns. A review
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of the correlations across shift and sex reveals how, with 
the exception of the ps Ss, differences by both sex and 
shift are cancelled when data is combined. It is interest­
ing to note that here the ps and zs Ss appear more nearly 
alike, whereas in the preceding section when means were 
compared the ns and zs Ss were more nearly alike.
To explore further the extent to which these groups 
are different, z ' tests of the difference between correla­
tions were done. The probability associated with the dif­
ference between the correlations of male ns and ps Ss is 
.02. From the correlations and their differences it ap­
pears that male ns and ps Ss represent different popula­
tions. The probability of the difference between female ns 
and ps Ss is .12. For the difference in correlations be­
tween male and female ns Ss the probability is .08. The 
probability for the difference between all ns and ps Ss is 
.08.
b. The second part of the third question is 
concerned with the relationship of Dsi and number of cate­
gories under the condition of greater ego-involvement on 
Sont II. The correlations between these two measures is 
shown in Table 6.
The correlations are significantly different from 
zero for the male ps Ss and for the total ps Ss. There is 
no significant correlation in either of the female groups. 
Again, the combination of male and female ps Ss produces a
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Table 6
Correlation of Number of Categories on 
Sort II with Dsi by Shift and Sex
Sex •
ns ps zs Total
r p r p r p r p
Male -.2213 .7249 <.05 .1740 .1766
F emale .1720 .4716 .4550 .2965
Total .0059 .5772 <.02 .4027 .2387
Tabled £  values are for two-tail test.
more significant correlation. The combination of male and 
female ns Ss produces a zero correlation apparently due to 
the opposite direction of the correlations obtained within 
each sex group.
The z' test of differences between correlations of 
the male ns and ps groups yielded a probability of .07- 
Between the correlations of female ns and ps groups the 
probability is .$4. The probability associated with the 
differences between the r_ for male and female ns Ss is .22, 
for male and female ps Ss, .26, and for total ns and ps Ss
is ,07. It is clear that male and female Ss are not as 
strongly differentiated as on Sort I and Dsi correlations. 
The same is true for female ns and ps Ss and for male and 
female ns Ss. The failure of the female ps Ss to increase 
in correlation is probably due to one subject. The
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correlations between number of categories on Sort II and 
Dsi for the zs Ss are, of course, identical with those ob­
tained of Sort I and Dsi.
4. Using the sum of difference scores (%ad) on the 
semantic differential as a gross measure of a kind of cogni­
tive style appropriate to that task, the questions were 
asked about the relationship of: a) X ad and the number of
categories under both conditions of ego-involvement, and b)
^  ad and Dsi.
a. The correlations between these two measures 
are presented in Table 7- The only group in which a corre­
lation was obtained which even approached significance was 
the Total zs group. This correlation is of interest because
it is the only evidence in this study which might suggest
that zs Ss differ from the other groups in ways other than 
the shift itself.
b. 2 a d  and Dsi. This relationship was investi­
gated on the assumption that Dsi may very well be a function 
of the typical number of differentiations a subject makes on 
self-related concepts within the limits imposed by the in­
strument, These relationships are presented in Table 8 .
The correlations are significantly different from zero for 
the male ps Ss (r = .773)5 female ps Ss (r = .907), and all 
ps Ss (r = .813). The correlation for total zs Ss (.722) is 
significantly different from zero. The totals within sex 
and total for all Ss are also significant. The difference
ko
Table 7
Correlation of Number of Categories 











Male -.133 .158 .532 .101
I Female .053 .439 .605 .257
Total -.007 .177 .576 <.10 .178
Male .078 .216 .532 .038
II Female .179 .486 .605 .107
Total .107 .333 .576 <.10 .070
Tabled £  values are for two-tail test
Table 8
Correlations of %  ad and Dsi by Shift and Sex
Sex Shift
ns ps zs Total
r p r  p r p r p
Male .391 .773 <.05 .666 .624 <.01
Female .430 .907 <.01 .756 <.10 .567 <.01
Total .390_______.813 <.001 .722 <.02 .573 <.001
Tabled 2  values are for two-tail test.
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between the correlations of male ns and ps Ss, and of fe­
male ns and ps Ss is not significant. However, the z ' test 
of difference of the total ns and ps Ss is significant at 
the .05 level.
5 . To facilitate a comparison of the results of 
this study and the Glixman study (I965) the correlations of 
the number of categories between Sort I and II were obtained, 
These correlations are presented in Table 9*
Table 9
Correlations of Number of Categories on 



















^Significant at .05 level. 
^Significant at .01 level. 
^Significant at .001 level.
Table 10 contains the relevant data from the Glixman 
(1965) study. Of particular concern are the correlations be­
tween War and Self. This aspect of the two studies will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
Table 11 is also from Glixman's I965 study and con­
tains the mean number of categories used in the different 
meaning domains by men and women.
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Table 10
Interdomain Correlation Coefficients 







* * * * *Objects .44 .20 .40 .59 .47 .47
* * ^   ̂ *War .80 .45 .66
Significant at .05 level.
* * Significant at .01 level.
^Taken from Glixman (I965, p . 372).
Table 11
Distribution of means over Sex and Meaning 






Male 13.00 5.42 5.53 7.98
Female 17.82 10.18 11.71 13.24
Total 15.28 7.67 8.44 10.46
Taken from Glixman (I965, p- 373).
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Reliability of the groupin.e; by differential re­
sponse . The answer to the first question posed by this 
study may be answered categorically: the number of Ss who
used fewer, more, or the same number of categories in the 
condition of greater ego-involvement was not significantly 
different from a chance distribution, either within sex or 
for the total (see Table l). The remaining questions were 
asked so that, regardless of the distribution, it might be 
discovered whether or not the differential response was 
accompanied by similar differential response patterns on 
other measures.
The difference found between ns Ss and ps Ss on 
Sort II is emphasized by the fact that they were not dif­
ferent on Sort I. They may thus be described as represent­
ing divergent responses to the ego-involving instructions. 
The results of the ^  tests in Table 4 emphasize the diver­
gence in that, for the ps group the increase in number of 
categories was significant at the .005 level, while the 
decrease for the ns group was also significant at the .005 
level. It should be emphasized that no differences between 
Sort I and Sort II appear when the data is analyzed only by 
sex or for the total. In other words, the differences are 
such that they cancel each other when the Ss are grouped 
only by sex or total. Hence, had not the Ss been segregated 
according to their differential response it would have been 
necessary to conclude that manipulation of ego-involvement
kk
by instructions had no effect on these Ss.
The opposite signs of the correlations between Dsi 
and number of categories on both sorts, plus the signifi­
cance of the difference between correlations for the male 
ns Ss and the male ps Ss, offers additional support for the 
discriminatory power of the differential response.
From the two sets of correlations involving Dsi and 
number of categories, the ps group appears to be rather 
homogeneous. This is not true with the ns Ss where a marked 
sex difference appears. The position of the zs Ss is some­
what ambiguous.
With the possible exception of the zs Ss the rela­
tionship of number of categories to ^ ad offers no further 
support to the notion that the shift variable reliably dis­
criminates a mode of cognitive organization. The correla­
tion (.576) for these Ss is the only quantitative evidence 
in the study which suggests zs Ss are different from the 
other groups. Even though the discriminating power of zs 
is quite tenuous, not including it in future research would 
possibly reduce the discriminating power of the other two 
differential responses.
The most conclusive evidence for the consistent 
differentiating capacity of shift is found in the relation­
ship of Dsi and X  ad. Here the correlations f^r ns and ps 
Ss is significantly different at the .05 level. The fact 
that these two measures are independent of the operations
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on the sorting tasks which provides the criteria response 
for separating them gives considerable weight to the relia­
bility of the discriminating power of the shift response.
The zs Ss are again, in the Dsi-^ad relationship, undiffer­
entiated. This variable has the least claim as a discrim­
inating variable.
To summarize, a divergent pattern of categorizing 
behavior emerges, both in relation to ego-involvement and 
to self-ideal discrepancy. The diverging pattern reliably 
delineates two populations according to the change in mode 
of response as a consequence of an increase in ego-involve­
ment. This pattern is inconsistent with the usual expecta­
tion that ego-involvement has a linearly inverse relation­
ship with categorizing behavior. Further, self-ideal dis­
crepancy, whether taken as a measure of internal stress or 
of a particular ego-relevant domain, shows no linearly in­
verse relationship with categorizing behavior. Rather, 
the present results suggest a more general reformulation 
is in order: a) Within individuals it appears that in­
creased ego-involvement results in cognitive reorganization; 
the nature or mode of the reorganization cannot be predicted 
from the stimulus situation. b) The relationship of self­
ideal discrepancy and categorizing behavior is a function 
of the ego-relevance of the situation and of the mode of 
reorganization when ego-involvement is increased.
In addition to the two main groups identified, the
46
data suggests a sex difference for the ns group and a 
slightly differentiated group.




Introduction. The purpose of this study is to 
determine whether or not differential categorizing behavior 
in two different degrees of ego-involvement reflects differ­
ent modes of cognitive organization. The particular formal 
aspect of cognitive organization under consideration is 
conceptual differentiation which categorizing behavior is 
assumed to represent. After a description of the restric­
tions placed on the generalizability of the results, the 
discussion will focus on various aspects of the results in 
the following order: interpretation of ego-involvement in
the study, a description of and speculation about the cog­
nitive processes in each of the groups and theoretical im­
plications, and a summary of the research suggested through­
out the body of the discussion.
Limitations of study. There are certain aspects of 
this study which need to be taken into account in consider­
ing the generalizations of the results.
1. The subjects in this study may be seen as self­
selected on two counts. First, only 49 of the 100 invited
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to participate responded. Secondly, the subjects have all 
made the same vocational choice of teaching. The person­
ality factors related to these two behaviors may also be 
related to the variables under study here.
2. The use of the mailing procedure leaves many 
aspects of the experimental situation uncontrolled. It is 
not known, for example, if Ss provided themselves enough 
space to sort the cards, whether or not they were inter­
rupted, or whether or not they had adequate time for the 
tasks. A major effect may have occurred as a function of 
not controlling for sequence of exposure to the two sort­
ing tasks.
3- Another bias probably occurred as a function 
of the E's position with the educational system from which 
the teacher-subjects were drawn. In view of the importance 
of source in communication, it seems likely that this fac­
tor was related to the self-selecting process as well as 
the responses, in spite of the assurances of anonymity.
4. A stack of 50 blank cards was given each S to 
separate the categories. This, of course, limited the 
number of categories to a maximum of 5O in both sorts. It 
should be noted none of the subjects used all of these 
cards. However, the number of these cards may have had an 
effect on some particular groups of subjects in this study. 
The basis of this speculation is the finding that dependency 
on external cues for cognitive organization is a variable
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with differential importance for the various groups of 
subjects. In short, the number of these cards may have 
constituted a demand effect (Orne, 1962).
5 . The most severe restriction placed on this 
study is the small n in each of the sex by shift groups 
which this study sought to delineate.
Ego-involvement. The salient features of the 
results are: a) failure of a significant number of Ss
to use fewer categories in the condition that has been 
called "greater ego-involvement," and b) the subsequent 
finding that a particular segment of those who do not use 
fewer categories in that condition Ss) manifest an
internal consistency of response patterns and are reliably 
different from the Ss (ns) who do follow expectations.
The difficulty comes in trying to account for the 
behavior of ps Ss. In terms of the accumulated evidence 
in the studies of ego-involvement and ego-relevant domains, 
the self-reflexive instructions should set the stage for 
an obvious condition of ego-involvement. THTis would also 
appear to be congruent with common language usage; that is, 
self-evaluation is ego-involvement.
It is, of course, plausible to say that the ps Ss 
simply were not ego-involved. But something systematic 
apparently occurred, and it seems reasonable to assume that 
it had something to do with these instructions. With no 
independent measure of ego-involvement with self it is
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clear that the only statement that can be made is in terms 
of an _a priori assumption that the stimulus condition de­
fined that particular form of ego-involvement. If this 
position can be tentatively accepted it might then be said, 
pursuant to further investigation, that differential re­
sponse reflects quite different modes of organizing exper­
ience of self. Further, that one of these modes (ps) is 
probably quite different from ego-involvement in the way 
the term is usually used. It is suggested that though the 
denotative meaning of the instruction for the two kinds of 
Ss is the same, the connotative meaning is probably quite 
different.
In any case, it seems clear that the progression 
from Sort I to Sort II cannot be seen as a linear extension 
of increased ego-involvement in terms of the response as, 
for instance, the progression from objects to war.
A comparison of the means of the self sorts in 
Glixman's (I965, 19^7; Glixman & Wolfe, 196?) studies with 
the means in this study suggests the presence of a differ­
ential preference for one or the other of two modes of re­
sponding to the statements. Instructions which simply ask 
S to sort the statements in whatever way the S feels is 
appropriate are likely to result in considerable variance 
of response. That is, they may sort them as statements, as 
on Sort I in this study, or they may sort them as self­
reflexive as on Sort II- In the latter case, according to
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the results here, another level of differential response 
to the self-reflexive domain takes place.
In this context, it seems appropriate to refer to 
the two instructional sets as defining a self-statement 
domain and a self-reflexive domain. The variable with 
which this study is chiefly concerned, the shift variable, 
can then be best described as a differential response to 
the seIf-reflexive domain. The operation, however, re­
quires responses to the seIf-statement domain to establish 
a base line for defining the differential response. Further 
study is needed to establish whether there is a response set 
for using the statements self-reflexively or as object- 
statements and, if so, whether it is related to the differ­
ential response.
The issue of the relationship of differential re­
sponse to the seIf-reflexive domain and ego-involvement in 
a social issue domain can then be addressed with at least 
two possible strategies: a) establish a sample of ns and
ps Ss and test whether there is a differential response to 
categorizing statements concerning a relevant issue with 
which the sample would likely be ego-involved. (For exam­
ple, it seems likely that the present Ss would see the 
current legislative program for education as extremely ego- 
involving.) b) Using the reverse approach, discover a 
sample presumably involved in an issue and test with own 
categories procedure and the two self domains to determine
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whether ns and ps Ss are differentially ego-involved. The 
latter strategy would appear to be more economical.
Description of the cognitive processes. In order 
to explore the characteristics of the cognitive organiza­
tion of the groups a tentative analysis of the tasks will 
be offered at this point. Since the measures obtained are 
assumed to represent levels of differentiation, this analy­
sis will be in terms of the differentiative-integrative 
dimension.
The categorizing task and semantic differential 
both require differentiative and integrative processes, but 
in different ways. The categorizing task, simply through 
the rubric of the instruction "to put together into groups 
the statements that seem to belong together" spells out the 
minimal integrative task. That is, the task is to find 
statements that are like one another (to the S) in some way. 
But the result of this operation is to define other state­
ments as "not like" which is a concomitant differentiating 
process and the one which becomes visible in these proce­
dures. However, these statements may be seen as alike to 
begin with in that they are all self-referring, first per­
son statements. Hence, the logic of the situation requires, 
if further sorting is to be done at all, the extraction of 
some additional dimension (or abstraction) to organize the 
items within categories. The capacity and/or readiness to 
extract these dimensions is then a determinant of the number
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of categories used.
From this analysis it may be tentatively inferred 
that both the use of a very few or a great many categories 
is an index of an unsuccessful interaction with the state­
ments to extract an added dimension to organize the state­
ments within categories. The mid-range may then be seen 
as representing an optimal level of integration of both 
within and between categories. In other words, the mid­
range appears to offer more possibility for integration 
between categories.
The differentiative-integrative tasks on the se­
mantic differential are considerably simplified relative to 
the categorizing tasks. The recorded response is on an or­
dinal position of likeness between the concept (e.g., My 
Ideal Self) and the selected polar word (e.g., good). The 
vehicle of integration is thus provided by the instrument 
itself in the ordinal scales and the S does not have to 
rely on his own resources for this factor as on the sorting 
task. It should be emphasized that the present data is 
only of the differentiative aspect of the differentiative- 
integrative dimension.
Although this task analysis emphasizes differences 
between the two instruments, there is a possibility of a 
common factor which was instrumental in the results obtained. 
Of the 15 scales used in the semantic differential, 7 load 
heavily on the evaluative factor according to various studies
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reported by Osgood (1964). An inspection of the Butler- 
Haigh statements (see Appendix A) leads one to suspect 
that most of them would also load on an evaluative factor. 
This similarity suggests the possibility that the two tasks 
may more nearly tap the same levels of personality than the 
comparison of the cognitive aspects of the tasks would sug­
gest.
From the postulated requirements of the tasks the 
ps group in using more differentiations perform in the way 
Gardner (1959) describes narrow equivalence range Ss, i.e., 
as adhering more closely to the criteria for inclusion in 
a category.
In view of the consistency of the positive corre­
lations on various measures ps Ss appear to maintain a 
consistent level of differentiation whether they supply 
their integrative vehicle or whether it is supplied by the 
instrument.
In the presumed optimal range the increase in dif­
ferentiation may reflect a realistic reliance on the capac­
ity to make differentiations and integrations in such a way 
as to add to the richness of experience.
The extended or extreme result of a cognitive oper­
ation based on increased differentiation would result in one
item per category. It is of interest to note that one-half 
of the ps Ss used 15 or more categories on Sort II; 4 used
22 or more; the highest number of categories was 29 « It
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seems reasonable to suspect that the extreme of this range 
represents diminished returns on the side of integration,
i.e., isolation or compartmentalization. In the Lewinian 
sense the extreme differentiation may represent more imper­
meable boundaries. It is suspected that Witkin's descrip­
tion of field-independent subjects is applicable here:
. . . although field-independent people are often
able to function with a fair degree of autonomy from 
others, some of them are strikingly isolated individ­
uals, overcontrolled, cold and distant, and unaware 
of their stimulus value (Witkin, et. al., I962, p. 3)*
The salient characteristic of this group is the pervasive­
ness of cognitive style. It is almost as if adhering more 
strictly to criteria is a fundamental trait of their per­
sonality organization.
Since Dsi is highly correlated with the two mea­
sures of cognitive differentiation (number of categories on 
Sort II and %  ad), interpreting Dsi for ps Ss as something 
other than another measure of this general style is unten­
able with the present data. This is not to say there is no 
motivational properties related to the magnitude of the dis­
crepancies. Indeed, if the suspected lack of integration 
at the extreme levels of differentiation does hold in further 
investigation it seems reasonable such motives could be in­
ferred .
For ns Ss Sort II is a movement toward dedifferen­
tiation. In other respects, too, they appear to be opposite 
the ps Ss. For example, they presumably are looser in the
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strictness of meeting criteria for inclusion of an item 
within a category, and consequently become less sensitive 
to subtler differences. It may, however, eventually be 
found that, rather than laxness in meeting criteria, they 
may perceive or develop less precise or more ambiguous 
criteria.
Ns Ss rely less on the capacity to interact with 
the material and extract added dimensions to integrate 
within categories. kl°/o of these Ss used only 2, 3, or 4 
categories. Speculating further, it is as if, in the 
absence of the contributed dimension, scales or abstrac­
tions, these Ss attempted to achieve precision by dichot­
omizing the statements.
The statistical analysis also strongly suggests 
a sex difference for ns Ss; hence further discussion of 
these Ss will be by sex.
Male ns Ss have a relatively strong negative cor­
relation between Dsi and Sort I, a non-significant negative 
correlation between Dsi and Sort II, and a non-significant 
positive correlation between Dsi and %ad. Two salient 
features emerge from this pattern. The first is the lack 
of similarity in the extent of differentiation across in­
struments and across content. The second feature is the 
inverse relationship between categorizing and Dsi. Prom 
these features these Ss seem to be characterized by a 
greater reliance on external cues for organization in
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inverse proportion to their use of internal resources.
The female ns Ss show no relationships between any 
of the sets of measures. This seems to be due to cluster­
ing within a relatively narrow range on all measures. The 
only statistically significant aspect of their data is the 
difference in number of categories on Sort I and Sort II. 
However, inspection reveals some interesting aspects of the 
data from this group.
Further reliability studies will have to determine 
whether or not shift will differentiate Ss who use the same 
number of categories under the condition of greater ego- 
involvement on other independent measures. In the present 
study the range of overlap of ns and ps Ss in number of 
categories on Sort II is 5 through 13- In checking the 
data further it is seen that dichotomizing the female ns 
Ss into two groups the overlap group who used 5 - 13 cate­
gories and those who used 2, 3, or 4 categories isolated 
the latter group as one where Ss attained low scores on all 
measures. In this sense the cognitive style of the female 
low categorizers may be said to be pervasive, as is the ps 
group. In this instance, however, little differentiation 
is made irrespective of content or instrument. Borrowing 
Witkin's term, these Ss appear to make extreme use of 
global thinking.
Further examination of the scores of the female 
high categorizers (ns) reveals a strong negative correlation
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between Dsi and Sort II (-.8769, significant beyond the .05 
level, 4 d.f.). The probability would thus seem to be high 
that female ns Ss represent two populations with the high 
category group being different from the male ns group only 
in the use of slightly more categories on both sorts. Thus, 
what originally appeared to be a between sex difference now 
appears to be a within sex difference.
For ns Ss (excluding the female low categorizers)
Dsi seems to emerge as a special component of cognitive 
organization with specialized meaning. It is speculated 
that the imbalance or motivational property imputed to this 
measure is a function not only of its magnitude but of the 
lack of integration with other components of personality 
organization. This is similar to Kaplan and Shannon's (I966) 
suggestion that self-ideal discrepancy reflects anxieties 
concerning inconsistencies in the self rather than inconsis­
tency itself. In terms of the task analysis reliance on 
external cues to differentiate self and ideal self increases 
inversely with the degree of reliance on internal resources 
to make differentiation about self. Thus, a high Dsi and a 
low number of categories seem to be reciprocal reflections 
of failure of self, a failure which is exacerbated by self­
reflexive involvement. For these Ss it would seem reason­
able to suspect that Dsi does represent stress as a function 
of its magnitude.
The obtained correlations for zs Ss between Dsi and
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the two sorts must be discounted for two reasons. First, 
there is a very low n, and second, one S accounts for most 
of the variance in each of the two groups.
Since the previous analysis is concerned with dif­
ferentiation of self, a brief comparison with Witkin's 
(1962) differentiation hypothesis seems in order. For 
Witkin, differentiation generally refers to the complexity 
of a system's structure. In terms of the tests used in re­
search (Rod and Frame, Embedded Figures Test), it specifi­
cally refers to the ability to experience the body as a 
discrete entity, as a special manifestation of a more gen­
eral capacity to keep things apart in experience (Witkin, 
et. al., 1962). The procedures used in this study identify 
subjects according to whether they differentiate or dedif­
ferentiate on a self-reflexive sorting task relative to a 
self-statement sorting task. Field-articulation measures 
and differential response as used in this study thus appear 
to have commonality of both content and cognitive organiza­
tion sufficient to warrant further investigation.
Summary of suggested research. Further study has 
been suggested at several points in the preceding discus­
sion. They may be summarized as follows:
1. Elaboration and refinement of procedures to 
discover modes of integration.
2. Test the relationship of shift and field- 
dependence measures.
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3. Further investigation of the relationship be­
tween ego-involvement as measured by own-categories proce­
dures and differential response to the self-reflexive 
domain.
4. Modification of the present procedures to in­
clude a larger n and other independent measures to
a. test the validity of the shift variable.
b. factor analyze the content of semantic 
differential and Butler-Haigh statements.
c. explore relationships of shift with inter­
personal style.




This study attempted to explore two sets of rela­
tionships, ego-involvement and categorizing behavior, and 
self-ideal discrepancy and categorizing behavior. The 
expectation has been for fewer categories to be used under 
greater degrees of ego-involvement, and for greater degree 
of self-ideal discrepancy. Since relevant studies report 
a minority of Ss who do not conform to expectations, this 
study sought to explore the possibility that those re­
sponses were also systematic. The procedures here made it 
possible to discover more about cognitive organization as it 
is related to number of categories on a self-reflexive 
sorting task relative to the number used on a self-state­
ment sorting task.
Of protocols mailed to 100 randomly selected ele­
mentary school teachers, kS Ss, 20 male and 29 female sub­
jects returned completed protocols. The protocols consisted 
of two sorting tasks and a semantic differential consisting 
of 4 concepts and 15 scales. The two sorting tasks con­
sisted of two identical sets of 50 of the Butler-Haigh (1950)
6l
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s elf-statements. The instructions were modifications of 
Gardner's Object Sorting Test (Gardner, et. al., 1959).
The modifications were such as to define two modes of re­
sponding to self domain statements: the self-statement
domain and the self-reflexive domain. The concepts on the 
semantic differential were "My Own Self", "My Ideal Self", 
"Other's Notion of Ideal Teacher", and "Own Notion of Ideal 
Teacher". From this instrument two measures were obtained, 
Dsi (self-ideal discrepancy) and %  ad which was used as an 
index of cognitive style appropriate for that instrument 
with self-related concepts.
The subjects were separated into sex by shift 
groups. Shift was defined by whether a subject used fewer, 
more, or the same number of categories on a self-reflexive 
sort relative to the number of categories used on a self­
statement sort. The distribution was tested by and
found to be non-significant. The difference in number of 
categories between shift groups within and across sex, be­
tween sex groups within and across shift, and between and 
within the two sorts were tested with student jt. Correla­
tions were obtained for the relationships between number of 
categories on both sorts, self-ideal discrepancy, and sum 
of all other difference scores on the semantic differential-
The findings of the study may be summarized as
follows :
1. The number of Ss who used fewer, more, or the
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same number of categories on the self-reflexive sort rela­
tive to a self-statement sort was not significantly differ­
ent from chance. The relationship of these two categorizing 
tasks thus cannot be seen as a linear extension of a dimen­
sion of ego-involvement.
2. The use of fewer and more categories identified 
two groups of Ss (male negative shift and all positive 
shift subjects) who are different on other measures.
3 . Task analysis and exploration of consistencies 
of other patterns reveals two sub-groups in the female neg­
ative shift group. This sex difference offers some possibil­
ity of clarifying what has been seen previously as between 
sex differences.
4. A fourth group, those who used the same number 
of categories on both sorting tasks (zero shift), are least 
differentiated on other measures in this study.
The presence or absence of cues to make the sorting 
task self-reflexive appears to be a determinant of categor­
izing behavior using self-statements. A comparison of the 
present study with the Glixman study suggests a differential 
preference for making the staternf .its self-reflexive in the 
absence of such cues.
Self-Ideal discrepancy has no linear relationship 
with categorizing behavior of self-statements. The meaning 
of this construct shoul^ be interpreted not only in terms 
of its magnitude, but whether or not the level of
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differentiation is congruent with the cognitive style in 
other measures. There appears to be no reason to consider 
self-ideal discrepancy a unitary construct.
Several restrictions limit generalizing these re­
sults. The most severe of these is the small n in each 
group.
Possibilities for further research were suggested 
and summarized in the previous chapter.
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feel uncomfortable while talking with someone, 
often kick myself for the things I do. 
often feel humiliated, 
doubt my sexual powers.
have a warm emotional relationship with others 
am responsible for my troubles- 
can accept most social values and standards, 









































hardest battles are with myself, 
tend to be on my guard with people who are 
somewhat more friendly than I had expected, 
am optimistic, 
am just sort of stubborn, 
feel helpless.
can usually make up my mind and stick to it.
decisions are not my own. 
often feel guilty, 









am no one. Nothing seems to really be me.
am afraid of what other people think of me.
am ambitious.
despise myself.
just don’t respect myself.
am a dominant person.
am assertive.
am confused.
am satisfied with myself, 
am a failure, 
am likable.
am relaxed, and nothing really bothers me.





83 I really am disturbed.
85 I feel insecure within my self.88 I am intelligent.
90 I feel hopeless.
93 I am inhibited.
95 I am unreliable.98 I feel adequate.







I II Dsi %  ad I II Dsi ^  ad
10 3 22 112 8 4 12 46
6 2 32 109 6 2 6 4o
12 3 11 81 23 10 18 72
Negative 6 5 28 102 5 3 10 75Shift 5 2 17 42 5 2 i4 69
9 8 15 59 22 4 12 98
7 5 21 224 4 2 14 85
9 4 15 30 15 8 16 86
3 2 11 88
10 5 34 93
7 6 28 157
23 13 13 111
7 4 13 156i6 12 13 80
10 l4 26 188 8 10 8 23
7 16 14 43 11 23 8 24
23 24 18 56 5 6 l4 32Positive 14 15 19 64 6 9 6 51Shift 9 29 23 85 12 22 33 15511 12 15 101 10 16 26 954 5 5 20 7 8 13 52
5 6 4 35 14 15 20 58
3 3 13 65 4 4 2 12Zero 3 i 3 9 32 5 5 26 60Shift 3 \ 3 9 57 6 6 21 72l4 14 11 69 6 6 21 72
7 7 33 84
7 7 13 8618 18 28 93
